Consciousness is subjective experience — what it is like, from the inside, to see red, feel cold or hear a chord. Explaining how physical processes produce it is among the hardest problems in philosophy.

The easy and the hard problems

David Chalmers drew the distinction in 1995. The easy problems concern functions: how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information, reports its own states, controls behavior. They are enormously difficult in practice and tractable in principle, because they ask how a mechanism performs a task.

The hard problem asks why any of that is accompanied by experience. A system could in principle perform every function while there is nothing it is like to be it. Explaining the function appears to leave the experience untouched, and that gap is what makes the problem hard.

Thomas Nagel set up the difficulty in 1974 by asking what it is like to be a bat. We can describe echolocation completely and still have no access to the character of the bat's experience, which suggests that objective description may leave something out.

The main positions

  • Physicalism holds that consciousness is a physical process, and that the appearance of a gap reflects the limits of our concepts.
  • Dualism holds that experience is a distinct kind of thing. This is the mind-body problem in its classical form, set by Descartes in 1641.
  • Functionalism identifies mental states with roles in a system, which allows that a different substrate could realize the same mind.
  • Panpsychism treats experience as a basic feature of matter, avoiding the question of how it emerges at the cost of a large commitment.

Why it resists settlement

Every other scientific explanation has worked by describing a mechanism from the outside. Consciousness is the one phenomenon defined by how it is from the inside, so the usual method has no obvious grip. That structural feature, more than any particular argument, is why the problem has stayed open.