The mind-body problem is the question of how mental states relate to physical states. Thoughts and sensations seem unlike anything physical, and they clearly interact with the body in both directions.

Descartes and the interaction difficulty

Descartes set the modern form in 1641. Mind is thinking and unextended; body is extended and unthinking. They are distinct substances, which explains why mental states appear so unlike physical ones.

The objection came immediately, from Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia in correspondence: if the mind has no extension and no physical properties, how does it move anything? Descartes pointed to the pineal gland, which names a location without explaining a mechanism. Causation between two substances sharing no properties has never received a satisfying account.

The physicalist options

Identity theory holds that mental states are brain states, in the way that lightning is electrical discharge. The objection is multiple realisability: creatures with different physiology might share a mental state, which they could not if the state simply were a particular neural arrangement.

Functionalism answers by identifying mental states with roles — a state caused by tissue damage, producing avoidance, is pain, whatever realizes it. This allows minds in different substrates and struggles with consciousness, since a role could be filled with nothing being experienced.

Eliminativism holds that beliefs and desires belong to a folk theory that a mature neuroscience will replace. Critics note that the position must be stated using the concepts it proposes to eliminate.

The residue

The functional questions have yielded steadily to research. The question of why any physical arrangement is accompanied by experience has not, which is why the hard problem is usually treated as the surviving core of the original puzzle.