Daniel Kahneman's 2011 book presents four decades of research on judgment, much of it conducted with Amos Tversky, through a distinction between two modes of thinking.

Two systems

System 1 is fast, automatic and always running. It reads faces, completes sentences and produces impressions without any sense of effort. System 2 is slow, deliberate and effortful, and it engages reluctantly because attention is limited.

Most errors come from System 1 producing a confident answer that System 2 does not check. The labels are presented as a useful fiction rather than a claim about brain anatomy.

The biases

The book catalogues the systematic departures the research uncovered. Anchoring: an arbitrary number shifts subsequent estimates even when its irrelevance is obvious. Availability: ease of recall substitutes for frequency, so vivid risks are overweighted. Representativeness: similarity to a stereotype displaces base rates.

Two are particularly useful commercially. Framing shows that logically equivalent descriptions of the same choice produce different decisions. Loss aversion shows that losses weigh roughly twice as heavily as equivalent gains, which explains why people defend a position they would not have chosen to enter. See loss aversion and sunk cost.

Prospect theory

The Nobel-cited work replaces expected utility as a description of choice under risk. Outcomes are evaluated as gains and losses from a reference point rather than as final states, and the reference point can be moved by presentation alone. Risk preference reverses between gain and loss framings.

Honest about its limits

Kahneman argues that knowing about a bias does little to prevent it in yourself, since System 1 produces the impression before deliberation begins. His practical recommendation is institutional: build procedures and checklists that catch the error, rather than relying on the individual to notice it. He later retracted a chapter relying on priming studies that failed to replicate, which is worth reading as an example of how to handle being wrong.